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The  success  of  the  US  motor  vehicle  companies  up  to  1955  and  their 
subsequent decline is directly related to the management-labor negotiations 
in the 1930s and the acceptance by both management and the mass union 
movement  of  the  inherent  nature  of  work  in  an  assembly-line  factory. 
Because the conditions of employment on the assembly line became less 
and less bearable over time, the negotiations became confrontational ones 
in which each side tried to get as much as possible from the other in a “win-
lose” setting. This ongoing confrontation let to the continuously escalating 
labor costs within  the  US  motor  vehicle  companies  that  ultimately  led  to 
their decline. Unlike the case of Japanese or European companies, the US 
companies never had a “win-win” proposal on the table. To understand how 
this  happened, we  will  first  describe  how,  on  three  occasions,  the  motor 
vehicle  industry  has  changed  the  most  fundamental  ideas  on  how  to 
manufacture  things  and,  what  is  more  important,  how  humans  work 
together to create value. 
 
Keywords: US motor vehicle companies decline, mass production system, 
lean  production  system,  reflective  production  system,  confrontational 
management-labor negotiations  
 5 
     
Introduction 
The success of the US motor vehicle companies up to 1955 and their 
subsequent decline is directly related to the management-labor negotiations 
in the 1930s and the acceptance by both management and the union 
movement of the inherent nature of work in a mass production assembly-
line factory. Because the conditions of employment on the assembly line 
became less and less bearable the negotiations between the United Auto 
Workers Union (UAW) and the Big Three (General Motors, Ford and 
Chrysler) became confrontational ones. .Each side tried to get as much as 
possible from the other in a “win-lose” setting. Unlike the case in Japan or 
Europe, there was never a “win-win” proposal on the table. This 
confrontation led to the continuously escalating labor costs for the US motor 
vehicle companies that ultimately led to their decline. 
To understand how this happened, we will first describe how, on three 
occasions, the motor vehicle industry has changed the most fundamental 
ideas on how to manufacture things and, what is more important, how 
humans work together to create value. The industry began at the end of the 
19
th century as a craft production system, with a workforce mainly 
comprised of skilled craftspeople that understood mechanical design 
principles and the materials they worked with. Many of the more 
experienced craftspeople became independent contractors working for or 
inside the factory. After World War I Henry Ford invented the mass 
production system in which each worker performed one particular task. 
Management came to consider the work force variable costs, and so was 
always trying to reduce these costs to improve the company’s bottom line. 
The mass production system was responsible for the extraordinary success 
of the US motor vehicle companies up to 1955. 
The Japanese and the Europeans, faced with the realization that due to 
its dead-end monotony the mass production system was unbearable for the 
workers, developed different approaches to the mass production system. In 
Japan after World War II Eiji Toyoda and Taiichi Ohno developed the Toyota 
Production System (TPS) that later became known as the ‘lean production 
system’. Toyota considered workers as fixed costs and continuously 
enhanced workers’ skills so as to gain more ongoing benefits from their 6 
     
seniority in the form of knowledge, experience and commitment. The 
Europeans, faced with the same dissatisfaction of their assembly line 
workers with the dull work, also adopted job enrichment and a technology-
oriented productivity strategy. In the case of Germany workers had 
representation on the board of the companies. One of the most emblematic 
attempts to humanize work and promote team work was the reflective 
production system pioneered by Volvo in the 1980s. The system was called 
reflective because the workers had to reflect over their work during the 
work process. 
The World motor vehicle industry and the decline in US participation 
The motor vehicle industry is the world’s largest manufacturing activity 
with 70.5 million new vehicles produced in 2008. Due to the financial crisis 
however, this was slightly lower than the 2007 production of almost 71.9 
million. Even with this slight reduction, 2008 production was 21 percent 
higher than the 2000 production of 58.3 million. The main reason for this 
was the extraordinary 465% growth in Chinese production, from 2.0 million 
in 2000 to 9.3 million in 2008; the significant 288% growth in Indian 
production, from 0.8 million in 2000 to 2.3 million in 2008; and a 58% 
growth in Brazilian production from 1.7 to 3.2 million in the same period. 
These growth rates widely compensated for the 47% decline in US 
production during these years, from 12.8 to 8.7 million vehicles 
(International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers). 
The decline in US motor vehicle production, the shift of production 
from some countries to others within the EU, the growth of Japan and 
Germany, and the extraordinary growth of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India 
and China) countries can be seen when comparing the list of the top ten 
vehicle manufacturing countries of 2008 with those of 2000. In 2008 
(Figure1) these were: (1) Japan with 11.5 million, (2) China with 9.3 
million, (3) the US with 8.7 million, (4) Germany with 6 million, (5) South 
Korea with 3.8 million, (6) Brazil with 3.2 million, (7) France with 2.5 
million, (8) Spain with 2.5 million, (9) India with 2.3 million, and (10) 
Mexico with 2.2 million produced (List of countries by motor vehicle 
production, Wikipedia). In 2000 the top ten were: (1) the US with 12.8 7 
     
million, (2) Japan 10.1 million, (3) Germany with 5.5 million, (4) France 
with 3.3 million, (5) Spain with 3.0 million, (6) Canada with 2.9 million, (7) 
Mexico with 1.9 million, (8) the United Kingdom (UK) with 1.8 million, (9) 
Italy with 1.7 million, and (10) Brazil with 1.7 million (International 
Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers). The 21% growth in world 
production between 2000 and 2008 occurred primarily in the BRIC countries 
to satisfy their internal demand - with few exports. The European Union 
(EU) countries together increased their production by 8 percent from 17.1 
million in 2000 to 18.4 million in 2008. 
 
Figure 1. Top 20 motor vehicles producing countries in 2008 
 
Source: Automotive industry, Wikipedia 
 
The largest motor vehicle manufacturers are multinationals with 
production facilities in many countries. The top multinationals, with 
production of over one million vehicles in 2008, were: (1) Toyota with 9.2 
million, (2) General Motors (GM) with 8.3 million, (3) Volkswagen (VW) with 
8.2 million (not including Scania), (4) Ford 6.4 million, (5) Honda with 3.9 
million, (6) Nissan with 3.4 million, (7) PSA (Peugeot and Citroen) with 3.3 
million, (8) Hyundai with 2.8 million (not including KIA with 1.4 million), (9) 
Suzuki with 2.6 million, and (10) Fiat with 2.5 million, (11) Renault with 2.4 
million, (12) Daimler with 2.2 million, (13) Chrysler with 1.8 million, (14) 
B.M.W. with 1.4 million, (15) KIA with 1.4 million, (16) Mazda with 1.3 
million, and (17) Mitsubishi with 1.3 million. The decline in US motor vehicle 8 
     
production primarily affected GM’s position. In 2004 GM was the number 
one world producer with 8.0 million vehicles, followed at a comfortable 
distance by second placed Toyota with 6.8 million, then Ford  with 6.6 
million, VW with 5.1 million, and Daimler Chrysler with 4.6 million 
(International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers). 
By 1950, near their peak, the US companies, utilizing Ford’s mass 
production and Alfred Sloan’s marketing and management techniques, 
dominated world motor vehicle production, accounting for 79.4% of the 8.0 
million vehicles produced (Grant, 2004). The US market also accounted for 
the largest percentage of the world’s motor vehicle sales. The giant 
enterprises GM, Ford and Chrysler accounted for 95 percent of all sales in 
the US, with six models accounting for 80 percent of all cars sold.  It was 
1955, when the US and Canada were producing 70.9 percent of the world’s 
9.2 million motor vehicles, that the decline began; 1955 was also the year 
that Sloan retired after thirty-four years as either the president or chairman 
of GM (Womack et al., 2007, p. 41-42). 
To understand the success of the US motor vehicle companies up to 
1955 and then their subsequent decline, we will now describe the 
management-labor relations and conflicts and how these were solved in the 
three basic production systems - the craft production system, the mass 
production system and its European humanization into the reflective 
production system, and the lean production system. 
The craft production system 
The first motor vehicles were created in 1885 when both Benz and 
Gottlieb Daimler separately introduced the first petrol engine driven four 
wheel carriages, the “Velozipede” (Clarke, 2005, p. 71). Motor vehicle 
production flourished in the late 1880s and early 1890s when the Paris 
machine-tool company of Panhard et Levassor (P&L) became the world’s 
leading motor vehicle company, building several hundred a year. P&L got its 
jump start on other competitors in 1887 when Emille Levassor negotiated a 
license to manufacture Daimler’s new “high-speed” gasoline engine 
(Womack et al., 2007, p. 19). P&L’s vehicles were designed according to the 
very modern in its time “Système Panhard” whereby the engine was in the 9 
     
front with passengers seated in rows behind, and the engine drove the rear 
wheels with a crude sliding-gear transmission (Panhard, Wikipedia). 
According to Womack et al. (2007, p.19-24) P&L was a classic craft 
production system that had originally manufactured metal-cutting saws, and 
later converted partially to manufacture motor vehicles. The workforce was 
mainly composed of skilled craftspeople who carefully hand-built motor 
vehicles in small numbers. These workers thoroughly understood 
mechanical design principles and the materials they worked with. Many of 
the more experienced workers were independent contractors inside the P&L 
plant, or independent machine-shop owners contracted to produce specific 
parts or components. 
The founders of the company, Panhard and Levassor, and their 
associates took orders directly from customers, who would define their 
requirements and determine the vehicle’s exact specifications. Based on 
these specifications P&L then ordered the necessary design, engineering 
and parts, and coordinated the assembly of the vehicle to exactly satisfy 
each client’s needs. Much of the work, including design and engineering, 
was subcontracted out to individual engineers and machine-shop owners 
scattered all over Paris. 
The P&L craft production system was a job process with low volume 
motor vehicles made to customer order and produced by skilled 
craftspeople with a flexible and unique sequence of tasks. This production 
process however, does not yield economies of scale. Even if P&L had tried 
to gain some economy of scale by building some identical cars or ordering a 
large quantity of parts and components they would still not have had any 
significant economy of scale because there was no real standard gauging 
system and the machine tools of the time could not cut hardened steel. 
The P&L contractors used slightly different gauges when making the 
parts and components. After they machined the parts they had to put them 
through an oven to harden their surfaces enough to withstand heavy use. 
The parts would frequently warp in the oven and require further filing to 
regain the intended shape. When these parts - with approximate measures 
- arrived at P&L for the final assembly, skilled fitters were required to file 10 
     
them down until they fitted together perfectly with the other parts. This 
process of filing and fitting each part to the next part had to be performed 
until the hundreds of parts of each motor vehicle were complete. This 
sequential fitting of each part had the consequence that when the fitters 
reached the last part, each completed motor vehicle would differ 
significantly in the dimension of its parts from others - even if they had 
been built with exactly the same specifications. 
Due to these technical limitations of the time P&L could not produce 
identical motor vehicles, so it concentrated on tailoring each one to the 
precise desire of each individual buyer. The P&L emphasis was on vehicle 
performance and hand-fitted craftsmanship in which the gaps between 
individual parts were nearly invisible. At that time this made perfect sense. 
The wealthy customers that could afford the P&L motor vehicles employed 
chauffeurs and mechanics on their personal staff and cost, driving ease, and 
simple maintenance weren’t their primary concerns: speed and 
customization were (Womack et al., 2007, p. 21). 
The craft motor vehicle production system of the end of the 19
th 
century had the following characteristics (Womack et al., 2007, p. 22): 
1.  A workforce that was highly skilled in design, machine 
operation, and fitting. 
2.  Decentralized organizations, with much of the design, 
engineering and machine-shop work done by contractors. 
3.  Owner/entrepreneurs who coordinated production in direct 
contact with everyone involved – customers, employees, and 
suppliers. 
4.  General-purpose machine tools to perform drilling, grinding, 
and other operations on metal and wood. 
5.  Very low production volume with none exactly alike because 
the craft techniques of the time inherently produced variations. 
 
The success of P&L in the 1890s was soon copied and by 1905, 
less than twenty years after they had produced the first commercially 
successful motor vehicle, hundreds of companies in Western Europe 11 
     
and North America were turning out motor vehicles in small volumes 
using the same craft techniques. The motor vehicle industry 
progressed to the mass production system after World War I, and 
P&L eventually floundered when trying to make the conversion 
(Womack et al., 2007, p. 23). Some companies using craft production 
systems have survived up to the present day, like Aston Martin and 
Morgan in the United Kingdom, and Ferrari in Italy. 
The mass production system 
The craft production system of motor vehicles reached its premature 
maturity in the 1910s. The general design of motor vehicles had converged 
to the P&L design of four-wheel, front-engine, and internal-combustion that 
still is the industry standard today. Because the high costs of producing 
motor vehicles did not drop with production volume, only the rich could 
afford to buy them. The many small independent craftsmen producing 
motor vehicles, parts and components were unable to produce any 
fundamental innovation to reduce costs and make them more affordable. 
This because any real technological advances to reduce production costs 
would have required expensive research that was much more than the 
technical tinkering these craftsmen were capable of doing. 
It was during this time that Henry Ford was trying to overcome the 
problems inherent to the craft production system. In 1908 he introduced 
the Model T, his twentieth design over a five-year period that had begun 
with the production of the original Model A in 1903. With the Model T, Ford 
finally archived his objective of a motor vehicle that was both easy to 
produce and user friendly. By user friendly Ford meant a motor vehicle that 
almost anybody could drive and repair, with no need for a chauffeur or 
mechanic like most other motor vehicle models of the time. These two 
achievements laid the groundwork for the revolutionary change in direction 
for the entire motor vehicle industry (Womack et al., 2007, p. 24). 
Ford’s key innovation to what he called mass production was the 
complete and consistent interchangeability of parts and the simplicity of 
attaching them to each other. To achieve this he vertically integrated 
production of all parts and components for the Model T, developed 12 
     
dedicated machines to produce these parts and components, and 
standardized the gauging system. He also benefited from the advances in 
machine tools which were now able to work on pre-hardened metals. This 
avoided the warping that had occurred when parts were hardened after 
being machined and that had previously made standardization impossible.  
All these factors taken together - a single model that was simple to 
produce and easy to use, the vertical integration of production of parts and 
components, the standardization of parts that fitted perfectly together, the 
use of dedicated machines to produce these parts, and the elimination of 
the skilled fitters who had comprised the bulk of the craftsmen used to 
assemble motor vehicles - gave Ford a tremendous advantage over his 
competitors. 
The assembly of Ford’s motor vehicles, beginning in 1903 with the 
Model A, involved setting up assembly stands on which a whole vehicle was 
built, often by one fitter. In 1908, on the eve of the introduction of the 
Model T, a fitter’s average task cycle (the amount of time he worked before 
repeating the same operation) totaled 8.56 hours. With the introduction of 
the Model T and its perfect interchangeability of parts, Ford decided that 
each assembler (there was no need for fitters because parts were perfect) 
would perform only a single task and move from vehicle to vehicle around 
the assembly hall. By August of 1913, just before the introduction of the 
moving assembly line, the average task for an assembler had been reduced 
from 8.56 hours to 2.3 minutes. The introduction of the moving assembly 
line further reduced the average cycle time, from 2.3 to 1.19 minutes 
(Womack et al., 2007, p. 25-26). 
What Ford did was to take Adams Smith’s (1864) idea first published 
in 1776 of the division of labor as being essentially positive in yielding 
increased productivity, and Charles Babbage’s (1832) idea of the necessity 
to match skills and job tasks. Frederick Winslow Taylor (2008) in 1911 
builds on these ideas to define the relationship between the worker and the 
work. The primary objectives of standardization for Taylor were first the 
fragmentation of skills into their smallest components (division of labor), 
and second, the separation of mental and physical work. As a consequence, 13 
     
the complex set of skills a craftsman used to build a motor vehicle before 
the introduction of mass production were fragmented into individual units, 
with each worker then merely performing one particular task in a manner 
considered to be the most effective and efficient. 
With this specialization, an assembler in Ford’s plants required only a 
few minutes of training. The performance of the assembler’s task was 
relentlessly disciplined by the pace of the assembly line, which sped up the 
slow and slowed down the fast. The foreman, who had previously had wide-
ranging duties and been responsible for a whole area of the factory, was 
reduced to a semiskilled checker spotting any failures in the allocated tasks 
on the assembly line. As a result, the workers on the line were as 
replaceable as the parts in the motor vehicles, and so became variable costs 
in the mass production system. 
Ford divided labor not only in the factory but also in the engineering 
shop. The knowledge workers who, according to Taylor, managed ideas and 
information but rarely touched an actual car or entered a factory, were also 
specialized into industrial engineers, manufacturing engineers, product 
engineers. This basic division was further specialized into industrial 
engineers for specific assembly operations or for special dedicated machine 
design. The same increasing specialization was also applied to the 
manufacturing and production engineers. As time went on the engineering 
profession branched into more and more subspecialties. These engineering 
professionals became more and more specialized and with time lost their 
overview of the other specialties. This minute division of engineering only 
grew, as to cope with the increasing complexity of new motor vehicles the 
US companies adopted ever more bureaucratic organizational structures 
with many procedures, protocols, and regulations to manage product 
development. These bureaucracies also became cumbersome and 
discouraged talented people from joining or staying in the companies. These 
two major factors explain why most technological innovations in the 1960s 
and 1970s came from Europe. Examples of European innovations during 
this period are front-wheel drive, disk brakes, fuel injection, unitized bodies, 
five-speed transmissions, and engines with high power-to-weight ratios 
(Womack et al., 2007, p. 44). 14 
     
Ford’s total vertical integration of the mass production system had 
introduced bureaucracy on such a vast scale that it brought its own 
problems, with no obvious solution. It was at this point that Alfred Sloan at 
GM complemented Ford’s ideas with his own basic management ideas that 
solved the problem of how to manage the complexity of the mass 
production system that was now inhibiting its spread (Sloan, 1990). Sloan 
created the concept of decentralized divisions managed objectively “by the 
numbers” from a small corporate headquarters. He also created the new 
professions of financial manager and marketing specialist to complement 
the engineering profession specialized by Ford, so that every area of the 
company now had its dedicated experts. This completed the division of 
professional labor proposed by Taylor. 
The consequence of Taylor’s basic separation between mental and 
physical workers was that the shop-floor workers (also called blue collar 
workers) in the mass production system had no career path, except perhaps 
to foreman. On the other hand, while the mental workers or professional 
specialists (also known as white collar workers) had a direct climb up the 
career ladder, unlike the skilled craftsmen of the 19
th century their career 
path didn’t lead toward ownership of a business. These professionals could 
only aspire to a career in the company’s bureaucracy, a factor which 
obviously turned many talented young entrepreneurs away from careers in 
the motor vehicle industry; entrepreneurs who then went to more promising 
industries such as electronics. 
Sloan’s organization created a revolution in management and 
marketing in the motor vehicle industry. However, it had not changed the 
fundamental idea, institutionalized by Ford, that workers on the shop floor 
were simply interchangeable parts and variable costs of the mass 
production system. On the shop floor then, matters went from bad to much 
worse. Ford himself had temporally calmed the situation in 1914 by 
doubling wages to the famous five dollars a day. Ford was able to take 
advantage of his company’s much higher efficiency over its competitors to 
portray himself as a paternalistic employer and so avoid unions (Womack et 
al., 2007, p. 40). 15 
     
The trouble with higher wages was that it worked and reduced 
turnover. This though created another problem: workers stopped dreaming 
about returning to the farm or to the old country from which they 
immigrated, and realized that a job at the assembly line was likely to be 
their life’s work. When that realization dawned, their conditions of 
employment rapidly came to seem less and less bearable. Additionally, 
since the US motor vehicle companies considered their workforce a variable 
cost, they would dismiss workers at the first sign of a downturn in sales. 
All this meant that by the time of the Great Depression the conditions 
for a successful union movement in the US motor vehicle industry were fully 
in place. This was a mass production union movement whose leadership 
fully accepted both the role of management and the role inherent nature of 
work in an assembly-line factory. Based on this, in the late 1930s the 
United Auto Workers (UAW) signed with what had become the “Big Three” 
(GM, Ford and Chrysler) an agreement in which the main issues were 
seniority and job rights. This union movement was called at the time ‘job-
control unionism’ (Womack et al., 2007, p. 40-41). 
These and subsequent negotiations between the union and 
management of the Big Three concentrated on confrontational negotiations 
with each side trying to get as much as possible from the other in a “win-
lose” setting. There was never a “win-win” proposal on the table because of 
Taylor’s segregation of the work force into blue collar workers and white 
collar workers. Because the blue collar work force had no career prospects 
the union’s negotiations were always motivated by getting more financial 
concessions, reducing working time, and job security. Management on the 
other hand considered the work force a variable cost, and so were always 
trying to reduce this cost to improve their company’s bottom line. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, as a consequence of the UAW 
negotiations its members had become one of the best paid groups of 
industrial workers in the country, placing them solidly in the middle class of 
American society. Additionally, besides their high wages the union workers 
also got generous benefits compared to those working at non-union 
Japanese auto plants in the US. Sorkin (2008) pointed out that, counting 16 
     
benefits, each UAW worker received 70 US dollars per hour while Toyota US 
workers received about 10 to 20 dollars less per hour for the same jobs. He 
also mentions that because of the union contracts GM at the time employed 
about 8 thousand people who actually did not work. These employees 
benefited from a supplemental unemployment benefit that gave laid-off 
workers most of their take-home wages. 
The predicament of the US motor vehicle companies was the 
consequence of the confrontational management-labor negotiations that are 
one of the primary reasons for the poor competitiveness of the Big Three. 
The other reason is that the large bureaucracies of the US car companies 
discouraged young ambitious and talented people from joining them, which 
meant that they were not able to keep up the fast pace of innovations in 
small and efficient vehicles characteristic of the Japanese and European 
manufacturers. 
The reflective production system 
The European motor vehicle companies that had copied Ford’s mass 
production system experienced in the 1950s what the Big Three US 
companies had experienced in the 1930s. After World War II the European 
plants employed large number of immigrants in the assembly lines. There 
was a mass influx of Turks and Yugoslavs to work in Germany, Moroccans 
and Algerians in France, and Sicilians and other southern Italians to work in 
the motor vehicle plants of Turin and Milan in Northern Italy. Some of these 
workers returned home after the postwar boom eased, but many 
assimilated and were joined by native workers. As in the US, these workers 
too realized that they would not progress to become independent craftsmen 
as their fathers and grandfathers had, and that dead-end monotony of mass 
production was going to be their life’s work. This realization made working 
in the mass production system unbearable and waves of unrest followed in 
Turin, Milan, Paris, and Wolfsburg. 
The negotiations between management and workers in Europe at first 
took the same confrontational tone as in the US. The largest difference was 
that European countries had much better social systems like medical care 
and pension plans, and there was not such a wide a gap in salaries between 17 
     
shop floor workers and top managers as in the US. For this reason the 
medical care and pension plans that were part of the packages negotiated 
by the US unions were not on the negotiation agenda in Europe. The 
negotiations about salaries were reasonable because the differences 
between workers and engineers were relatively modest in Europe. The 
income inequality between the richest 10 percent and the poorest 10 
percent in the US is 15.9 times, in Germany is only 6.9 times, in France 9.1 
times, and in Italy 11.6 times (Human Development Report 2007/2008, 
2007, p. 281). The modest salary differences in Europe in contrast to the 
US focused the management-labor negotiations upon the reducing hours 
spent in the plant doing dull work. In some cases workers were even willing 
to take salary reductions for fewer hours spent in the plants. 
The European motor vehicle manufacturers, realizing the problem of 
dull work, tried some experiments in job enrichment. The most radical at 
the time was undertaken in the early 1970s by Volvo’s new CEO, P. G. 
Gyllenhammar (Ellegärd, 1996, p. 124) who had strong appreciation of the 
social dimension of work. He had to deal with workers’ low commitment to 
the work and the low degree of work satisfaction in the Volvo plants. To 
mitigate these problems the decision was taken to open a new plant in 
Kalmar with the goal of humanizing the work and promoting teamwork on 
the shop floor. In the Kalmar plant the assembly line was literally broken 
into sections. All work was organized in teams, each of which had its own 
section in which team members performed their extended assembly work 
tasks. The physical and social environment was greatly improved in 
comparison to other traditional Volvo plants applying Ford’s mass 
production system. 
Volvo in the mid 1980s innovated again with a new plant in Uddevalla 
(Ellegärd, 1996, p. 126). The company had realized that the number of 
young people in the European labor force would decline by the mid 1990s, 
so they decided to build a factory that could attract not only young male 
workers but also females and older people. In this new plant the assembly 
line was completely abandoned and small teams, working parallel to each 
other, were responsible for the assembly of complete motor vehicles. The 
central issue for this approach was how to teach to the workers the 18 
     
extended work content required for only a handful of workers to be able to 
assemble a complete vehicle. To do this Volvo adopted a holistic learning 
strategy where skilled workers taught newly employed workers how to 
assemble the vehicles. Employees not only learned how to build motor 
vehicles, they also learned how to perform several supporting tasks, 
economic tasks and so on. The teams planned their own production and 
were able to make plans in pursuit of their educational needs. 
The production system developed for the Uddevalla plant is called the 
“reflective production system” because workers have to reflect over their 
work during the work process in such a way that the product reflects the 
workers performance back to him/her, which makes it possible for workers 
to improve upon working methods. The developments at the Kalmar and 
later at the Uddevalla plants inspired managers and trade unionists in 
Europe to begin thinking in new directions with respect to the organization 
and content of work. Furthermore, the reflective production system was 
later applied by Saab at its Trollhättan plant, and it influenced the Rastatt I 
plant of Mercedes-Benz, and the introduction of the modular units at GM 
and VW. 
Unfortunately Volvo suffered severely from the fall in worldwide 
demand for cars in the early 1990s; the Volvo Car Company was sold to 
Ford in 1999, and the two innovative plants in Kalmar and Uddevalla were 
closed. Since then, the Volvo Car Company under Ford has had no unique 
alternative to assembly line production. Nevertheless, the Uddevalla plant 
was reopened by Autonova AB and Volvo maintained a 49 percent share in 
the plant. The principles of the reflective production system continue to be 
developed by Autonova AB at the Uddevalla plant (Ellegärd, 1996, p. 133). 
The lean production system 
The Toyota Motor Company was founded in 1937 by the Toyoda 
family. During World War II Toyota built trucks largely using the craft 
production system. In the thirteen years to 1950, Toyota had produced 
2,685 motor vehicles. This was also the year that the young engineer Eiji 
Toyoda made a three month visit to the Ford Rouge plant that produced 
7,000 motor vehicles in a single day. This plant was the largest and most 19 
     
efficient in the world. After his return to his native Nagoya, Eiji Toyoda and 
the production genius Taiichi Ohno concluded that Ford’s mass production 
system could never work in Japan for the following four reasons (Womack 
et al., 2007, p. 48-49): 
1.  The Japanese domestic market was very small and demanded 
a wide range of vehicles. 
2.  The Japanese worker was not willing to be treated as variable 
cost or interchangeable cost. 
3.  Management’s right to lay off people was severely restricted, 
and the bargaining position of company unions representing all 
employees  (including  managers)  was  greatly  reinforced  (this 
was  based  on  labor  laws  introduced  by  the  US  occupation 
authorities  that  had  strengthened  the  position  of  workers  in 
negotiations). 
4.  The  war-ravaged  Japanese  economy  was  starved  for  capital 
and foreign exchange, which made it difficult to purchase the 
latest Western technology.  
 
These factors forced Toyota to develop techniques to produce small 
batches efficiently with fewer flexible machines instead of the enormous 
runs on dedicated machines that was the norm in mass production. By 
doing this they discovered two fundamental things: the first was that 
producing small batches cost less because it eliminated the need for large 
inventories; and the second that assembling them immediately caused 
mistakes to show up almost instantly. The consequence of this second 
discovery was enormous. The workers making the parts got immediate 
feedback on their quality and began to pay more attention, and so avoided 
the waste of large numbers of defective parts. 
The drawback of the system was that if workers failed to anticipate a 
problem before it occurred and did not take the initiative to correct it 
immediately the work of the plant could easily come to a halt. Holding back 
knowledge and effort, as was common among the workers who had a low 
commitment to work and low degree of work satisfaction in Ford’s mass 20 
     
production system, would lead to constant problems at the Toyota plants. 
Fortunately this did not happen, because Toyota had negotiated a 
compromise formula with the company’s union in the crisis of 1949 that 
allowed them to terminate a quarter of the workforce. The formula, which is 
still applied in the Japanese motor vehicle industry, gave the remaining 
employees two guarantees. One was life-time employment, and the other 
was for pay to be steeply graded by seniority rather than by specific job 
function, and total remuneration tied to company profitability through bonus 
payments (Womack et al., 2007, p. 53). 
The implication of this historic agreement was that the workers were 
from then on a fixed cost, and the longer they stayed in the company the 
higher this cost got. To get the most from its workers Toyota continuously 
enhances the workers’ skills to gain continuously more benefit from their 
seniority in form of more knowledge, experience and commitment. These 
are the similar ideas to those developed for the Volvo Uddevalla plant that 
evolved into the reflective production system. 
The result of Toyota’s approach to human resources made it possible 
to group workers into teams to perform a set of assembly steps under a 
team leader. The team leader would do assembly tasks, as well as 
coordinate the team, and, in particular, would fill in for any absent worker. 
Additionally the team had the job of housekeeping, minor tool repair and 
quality-checking. Besides this, the teams periodically take some time to 
collectively suggest ways to improve the process (this collective work to 
improve the process, kaizen in Japanese, became known in the West as 
“quality circles”). 
The team effort was easier to implement in Japan than in the US 
because there the work force was never as extensively divided into blue 
collar and white collar workers. Another factor was that the difference in 
salaries between engineers and workers was very modest. Japan has one of 
the lowest income inequalities in the world, with the income of the richest 
10 percent of the population being only 4.5 times higher than the income of 
the lowest 10 percent (Human Development Report 2007/2008, 2007, p. 21 
     
281). To further stress the teamwork aspects the Toyota engineers wore 
the same work clothes as the common workers. 
In sharp contrast to the situation in Japan and Europe, management-
labor negotiations in the United States have been an obstacle to 
implementing teams in manufacturing. The UAW in the U.S. has not 
supported self-managed teams, loose job classifications, or the combination 
of direct and indirect labor tasks. This is because these organizational 
innovations have been perceived as ways of getting employees to do more 
work for the same pay. Job classifications, in particular, are considered to 
have been an important contributor to the decline of U.S. manufacturing 
productivity. At one time some assembly plants listed as many as 50 to 100 
different work classifications. These limit flexibility because workers are not 
required to perform tasks outside of their classification and corresponding 
pay scale. In contrast, plants modeled after the Japanese team concepts 
have only about four or five job classifications (Fuxman, 1999, July).  
Taiichi Ohno, the production genius at Toyota, had fully developed the 
Toyota production system (TPS) by the end of 1960s. He had introduced 
“the five why’s” for production workers to trace systematically every error 
back to its ultimate cause (by asking “why” as each layer of the problem 
was uncovered), then to devise a fix so that it would never occur again. He 
had also developed a new way to coordinate the flow of parts within the 
supply system on a day-to-day basis, the now famous just-in-time system, 
called kanban at Toyota. This last idea simply converted the suppliers and 
parts plants into one large system. In this system, each part was only 
produced at each previous step to supply the immediate demand of the 
next step (Liker, 2004). 
Toyota also did not adopt Ford’s organization model of dividing 
engineering into specialties. Eiji Toyoda and Taiichi Ohno decided early on 
that product engineering encompassed both process and industrial 
engineering. They formed teams with strong leaders that contained all 
relevant engineering expertise. Career paths were structured to reward 
strong team players rather than individual specialists. As a consequence 
Toyota’s engineering excelled in productivity, product quality, and 22 
     
responsiveness to changing consumer demand (Womack et al., 2007, p. 
63). 
The TPS was developed to achieve maximum economic efficiency with 
a minimum of available resources. Thus the key focus is to reduce any kind 
of wasteful, non product-value adding activity. For this reason the TPS 
became known as the lean production system. 
The current trend in production systems 
The MIT study The machine that changed the world (by Womack et 
al.), published in 1990, propagated the TPS as the basis of the universal 
principles of the lean production system that later was termed ‘lean 
thinking’. This motivated the Western motor vehicle manufacturers to 
examine the claims of the MIT study, and so called benchmark trips to the 
Toyota plants in Japan were organized for these companies’ senior 
production managers by McKinsey and Andersen Consulting. As a result the 
lean production system became the model for most companies in 
developing their own production system (Clarke, 2005, p.119). 
During the 1980s and 1990s all the world’s car manufacturers 
redesigned their production system to incorporate variants of Toyota’s lean 
production system. Some of the key elements that were copied were 
statistical process control, just-in time scheduling, quality circles, 
teamwork, and flexible production (more than one model manufactured on 
a single production line). One of the important practices that were 
introduced was the transition from static concepts of efficiency optimization 
towards continuous improvement to which every employee contributed. 
The transition to new manufacturing methods required heavy 
investment by the companies in both capital equipment and training. The 
1980s were a period of unprecedentedly high investment expenditure. 
However, according to Grant (2004), the critical elements of Toyota’s lean 
production system were not new production “hardware” in the form of 
robotics and computer-integrated manufacturing systems - as GM learned 
after spending 10 billion dollars in upgrading its plants. The critical elements 
were the “software” that operated the plants, particularly the management-
labor relations, the teamwork required, the workers’ skills, the shop-floor 23 
     
organization, and the relationship with suppliers. Unfortunately, because of 
the confrontational management-labor negotiations with the UAW and the 
lack of vision of both the union leadership and the bureaucrat-managers of 
the Big Three, these critical elements were never completely understood 
and implemented. This deficiency was probably the most important factor 
that precipitated the decline of the US motor vehicle industry. The 
Europeans, in contrast, because of their strong appreciation of the social 
dimension of work had a much easier task in adopting the new concepts. 
Conclusion and consequences 
The US motor vehicle companies were never able to change from 
Ford’s mass production system to the Japanese lean production system 
because of the confrontational management-labor negotiations. Neither the 
management-bureaucrats nor the UAW leadership could overcome Taylor’s 
fragmentation of skills into their smallest components (division of labor) or 
the separation of mental and physical work. This fragmentation was 
responsible for the excessive specialization of engineering and management 
in the US motor vehicle industry that transformed it into a cumbersome 
bureaucracy that scared away more entrepreneurial talents and slowed 
down innovation. The separation of mental and physical work created an 
apparently insurmountable barrier between the college-educated white 
collar workers and the poorly schooled blue collar workers. Furthermore, the 
white collar workers considered the blue collar workers to be variable costs 
that could be hired and fired according to the production needs, while the 
blue collar workers wanted more and more pay and benefits to compensate 
for the hours spent doing dull work in the mass production assembly line. 
The consequence of the bureaucracy was that management was not 
creative enough to overcome the confrontational negotiation mode with the 
UAW, and change it from the “win-lose” mode to a “win-win” mode like the 
Japanese and the Europeans had. The large income inequality between 
management and workers, and the exclusion of the workers from any 
career possibility in the US motor vehicle industry led inevitably to a form of 
class war between the white and the blue collar workers. Managers made 
their careers by cutting costs and the expenses of the workers, and union 24 
     
leaders made their careers by confronting management and so squeezing 
more and more concessions in the form of salaries and benefits. The 
consequence was a constant escalation over the years of the costs of the US 
motor vehicle companies. Toyota and other non US-owned motor vehicle 
producers were careful to not get into the confrontational management-
labor negotiations of the Big Three US producers and so avoided the labor 
cost escalation. As a consequence Toyota in 2008 had a 21 dollar an hour 
lower total labor cost advantage over GM (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. In November 2008 GM and the UAW were negotiating a new 
contract. But even with the new contract, there will still be about a $14 an 
hour pay gap in total labor costs between GM and Toyota, and more than a 
29% wage premium for UAW workers compared to their non-union 
counterparts at Toyota. 
 
Source: Perry (2008, November 24). 
 
The slowness of the GM bureaucracy to respond changing customer 
preferences was also a factor that led to a constant decrease in market 
share in the US and contributed to the company’s decline. An example of 
this inefficiency of the GM bureaucracy was the case of sport utility vehicles 
(SUVs). In 1990 GM was caught napping when customers started preferring 
SUVs like the Explorer model Ford had launched that year. GM overreacted 
by pouring time and money into SUVs at expense of car development. When 
the market changed GM was stuck with its SUVs in a market awash in new 
models and needed to give substantial discounts to keep up sales. A symbol 
of the lack of product foresight was the launch of the high-end Hummer in 
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2003 and the compact H3 in 2005, especially given that some of the larger 
Hummers barely managed 10 miles per gallon.  
Another example of bad management by GM is the case of the EV1 
electrical car. GM started working on the EV1 at about the same time that 
Toyota started working on the Prius (a full hybrid electrical mid-sized car) in 
the 1990s. Toyota started selling the Prius in Japan in 1997, around the 
same time as GM was fleet testing its EV1. Because of the public relations 
debacle when the test cards had to recalled, GM abandoned the EV1 
program and its lead in electrical car technology, thus handing the lead to 
Toyota with its Prius (Carty, 2009, June 2; and Toyota Prius, Wikipedia). To 
make things worse, in the same year as Toyota was launching the 
environmental conscious Prius worldwide, GM launched the Hummer with its 
absurd gasoline consumption. 
The cost disadvantages compared to its foreign competitors like 
Toyota, along with the incapability of its management-bureaucracy to 
respond to changing customer preferences, ultimately led to GM’s 
bankruptcy on June 1 2009 and GM is now 72 percent government owned 
(Figure 3).  
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Figure 3. The GM bankruptcy June 1, 2009 and the 72 percent state 
ownership by the US and Canadian governments  
 
Source: Vlasic (2009, June 1) 
 
Another of the US Big Three, Chrysler, filed for bankruptcy in April 30 
of 2009, before GM, for the same reasons (management-bureaucracy and 
confrontational management-labor negotiations) that were responsible for 
its lack of innovation and high labor costs. The irony in the Chrysler case is 
that the UAW with 55 percent participation is now the majority owner of 
company (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4. The Chrysler bankruptcy April 1, 2009 and the 55 percent UAW 
ownership 
 
Source: Rutenberg & Vlasic, 2009, April 30. 
 
Chrysler has always been the weaker of the Big Three and became the 
first major American automaker to seek bankruptcy protection since 
Studebaker did so in 1933. GM followed Chrysler into bankruptcy June 1
st, 
2009. These two bankruptcies were humbling moments for a US motor 
vehicle industry that had dominated the world markets in 1950 with almost 
80 percent of the total world production of 8 million and 95 percent of all 
sales of motor vehicles in the US (Grant, 2004). Chrysler had recovered 
strongly after a near bankruptcy in 1979 with the help of US government 
before entering again in decline under the ownership of Daimler-Benz and 
as of 2007 under Cerberus Capital Management. 
Ford, the last of the Big Three, was able to survive the financial crisis 
of 2008 without US government help and seems to be slowly recuperating. 
But it has the same problems as GM and Chrysler. Unfortunately for Ford, 
because it has not filed for bankruptcy the UAW is unwilling to give it the 
same concessions that it gave the other two of the Big Three (Bunkley, 
2009, October 31). This means that not only will Ford’s labor costs be 
higher than those of GM and of Chrysler, Ford will also have the financial 
costs of its substantial debt that the other two don’t have because their 
debts were written off by their bankruptcies. With these two substantial 
competitive disadvantages (higher labor and financial costs) in relation to 
its direct competitors (GM and Chrysler) Ford’s future is far from certain. 28 
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